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A report is provided of an evaluation of two “Senior Colleges” designed to offer viable alternatives to traditional secondary education for students above the age of compulsory schooling. The evaluation involved several researchers working independently and information collected using a variety of both quantitative and qualitative methods (including student and staff interviews and questionnaire surveys, nominal group procedures with staff and administration of instruments assessing student perceptions of classroom‐level and teacher perceptions of school‐level environment). The most striking finding emerging from almost every aspect of the evaluation was the success of the Colleges in creating a positive ethos for both students and staff. Some of the areas of concern which were identified included a relatively low level of student cohesiveness, confusion about the purpose of the Colleges, the distracting behaviour of some younger students and staff's conditions of service.

Transaction cost economics is an important anchor for analyzing a wide range of economic and organizational issues and is complemented by various theories, resulting in a perception shift of transaction governance structure from a polar classification toward a continuum (John & Reve, 1982; Heide & Miner, 1992; Hennart, 1993). Despite conceptual framework developments, empirical studies based on the continuum are scarce. This research is an initial effort toward TGS dimensionalization and operationalization and reviews theoretical developments since 1930, surveys empirical studies from 1982 to 2004, presents Williamson’s framework (1991), and proposes a set of items for instrument design.

Some understanding and form of inter‐organisation management is necessary and desirable if a channel is to maintain or achieve satisfactory performance as a competitive entity (Stern and El‐Ansary 1992). Although this view is not novel (of. Alderson 1954,1957), it has not been the subject of extensive research (Frazier 1983), and interorganisational coordination in distribution channels has perhaps received less focus as a survival requirement (Dwyer and Oh 1988) than it deserves. Stern and El‐Ansary (1992) seem to reflect traditional points of view when stating that power is the major means available to achieve coordination and co‐operation among channel members. Power, however, gives rise to channel dependence and interdependence issues, (of. Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Gaski 1984; Brown, Lusch and Muehling 1983), and issues of interorganisational governance mechanisms which for some years have also interested institutional economists, (of. Williamson 1993, 1991, 1986, 1981, 1975, Ouchi 1980) and economic sociologists, (of. Granovetter, 1985, Granovetter and Swedberg 1992). The marketing literature (of. Heide and John 1992; 1990; 1988) has questioned Williamson's somewhat simplistic treatment of opportunism as an underlying behavioural norm, central as this is to his transaction cost paradigm. Since Heide and John's [1992] work on the role of norms in marketing relationships, there is a distinct possibility that insufficient further research has been done in order to allow comparisons of their findings with those of other studies that differ with regard to cultures, settings, and time periods. Maintaining focus on the transaction between dyadic exchange partners as a fundamental activity in marketing channels (of. Achrol, Stern, and Reve 1983), the objectives of this article are to examine the existence or otherwise of relational norms between dyadic exchange partners serving as a governance mechanism safeguarding against opportunistic behaviour in the presence of transaction‐specific assets. The work of Heide and John [1992] shed much light on this, but examined the dyad from the perspective of a strong buyer facing a large number of small suppliers. We will focus on a strong supplier, facing a large number of small buyers, currently, but not indefinitely, bound to it by legislation and contract. The perspective adopted will be that of many small buyers (phar‐macies) from a monopolistic ethical drug wholesaler, at the time of dismantling of a statutory wholesale drug monopoly in Norway.

Aim of the present monograph is the economic analysis of the role of MNEs regarding globalisation and digital economy and in parallel there is a reference and examination of some legal aspects concerning MNEs, cyberspace and e‐commerce as the means of expression of the digital economy. The whole effort of the author is focused on the examination of various aspects of MNEs and their impact upon globalisation and vice versa and how and if we are moving towards a global digital economy.

Numbers of worthy people are no doubt nursing themselves in the fond and foolish belief that when the Food Bill has received the Royal assent, and becomes law, the manufacture and sale of adulterated and sophisticated products will, to all intents and purposes, be suppressed, and that the Public Analyst and the Inspector will be able to report the existence of almost universal purity and virtue. This optimistic feeling will not be shared by the traders and manufacturers who have suffered from the effects of unfair and dishonest competition, nor by those whose knowledge and experience of the existing law enables them to gauge the probable value of the new one with some approach to accuracy. The measure has satisfied nobody, and can satisfy nobody but those whose nefarious practices it is intended to check, and who can fully appreciate the value, to them, of patchwork and superficial legislation. We have repeatedly pointed out that repressive legislation, however stringent and however well applied, can never give the public that which the public, in theory, should receive—namely, complete protection and adequate guarantee,—nor to the honest trader the full support and encouragement to which he is entitled. But, in spite of the defects and ineffectualities necessarily attaching to legislation of this nature, a strong Government could without much difficulty have produced a far more effective, and therefore more valuable law than that which, after so long an incubation, is to be added to the statute‐book.